
This article introduces a model of political theory for studying the relationship between the vote-buying strategy of a party that has won the mayoralty of a municipality in the last elections and its preferences on the municipal political space, given its desire to maintain its position in the following election through its votebuying strategy. The main objective of the proposed analysis is to demonstrate that the governing party prefers to promote, given the topology of the Exchange network induced by its clientelistic structure, the political agendas with which it impoverishes not only worse-off (WO) individuals but else better-off (BO) individuals, through inadequate and inefficient investment in provision of public goods.

Once a political agenda is established this way in the negotiation with other veto players in the political space, equilibrium prices in vote markets will be reduced in a next election, and therefore, it will help enable the governing party to achieve its objective of maintaining governmental power through its vote-buying strategy in the exchange network.

Keywords: network games, vote purchasing, poverty, political competition. JEL: C72, C70, D31.